Procedure of Preventive Review of the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech Republic by Filip, Jan
Legal studies and practice journal research revue  
206 
Procedure of Preventive Review of the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech 
Republic 
Jan Filip*
In 2001, the Czech Republic adopted the so-called 
Euro-amendment to the Constitution of the Czech Re-
public (Constitutional Act No. 395/2001 Sb.),1 introdu-
cing a number of significant changes in the constitu-
tional order from the points of view of international and 
domestic law (Art. 1 para. 2 and Art. 10 of the Con-
stitution of the Czech Republic – hereinafter “the 
Constitution”). At the same time, the amendment pro-
vided for the possibility of transferring some of the 
powers of state authorities to international organizations 
or institutions (cf. Article 10a para. 1), thereby setting 
the constitutional prerequisites for the accession of the 
country to the European Union. It also vested the Con-
stitutional Court with the power of preventive review of 
the constitutionality of international treaties, which had 
previously not been regulated in the Czech legal sys-
tem.2 In this connection, a new part II (Art. s 71a-71e) 
was included in Act No. 182/1993 Sb. on the Constitu-
tional Court on the basis of its amendment No. 48/2002 
Sb.,3 which regulated the procedure to be followed by 
the Constitutional Court during its preventive review. 
However, this possibility of judicial review, which 
thus became available for authorized subjects from 1 
June 2002, remained unexercised for a long time. It 
took six years4 before the Senate decided in April 2008 
– after the complicated discussions over the government 
proposal to approve the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty, amending the Treaty on the European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community – 
to file a motion to the Constitutional Court to assess the 
conformity of the Lisbon Treaty with the constitutional 
order. Thus, this proposal, submitted to the Constitutio-
nal Court on 30 April 2008, became the very first mo-
tion for the preventive review of an international treaty 
to be admitted to the Constitutional Court, and it will be 
heard. Owing to the progress of the ratification of this 
treaty in the other EU sates, the future decision of the 
Constitutional Court is eagerly anticipated, not only by 
Czech authorities, politicians, and the public, but also 
EU bodies and those states where the process of rati-
fication has not been finished yet and where it is hoped 
that the Lisbon Treaty will not come into effect as a re-
sult of this decision. This study aims to point out certain 
procedural issues which the Constitutional Court will 
have to address in this connection. Issues related to the 
content are disregarded on purpose, since they are 
beyond the scope of the present text. 
1. Formulation of the text of the Lisbon 
Treaty and the Constitutional Court 
The future groundbreaking decision by the Consti-
tutional Court will have to address a whole range of 
issues. As indicated by the declarations of the Chairman 
in the media, what is problematic is not only the actual 
decision of correspondence or non-correspondence of 
the Lisbon Treaty with the Czech constitutional order, 
but also the manner in which the decision is to be 
arrived at. Prior to the decision itself, the Constitutional 
Court will have to adopt a position on the interpretation 
of the 2nd part (Art. 71a-71e) of the Act on the Constitu-
tional Court. 
The current situation is similar to the referendum on 
the Accession Treaty in 2003. During that referendum, 
Czech citizens had the first opportunity to vote in a re-
ferendum on a question that was rather difficult – with 
respect to how extensive the text of the treaty was. The 
same holds true now for the Constitutional Court, which 
is to apply the provision on the preventive review of an 
international treaty for the first time. Its task is to assess 
the amended text which is, as regards its formulation, 
rather complex and unclear, requiring a difficult recon-
struction because it is impossible to understand it with-
out the texts of the existing treaties on the EU and EC.5 
In fact, should the task of the Constitutional Court be to 
assess the constitutionality of an amendment or a revi-
sion of a law that would be drafted in a form similar to 
the Lisbon Treaty, then it should – in accordance with 
the past declarations of the same court on the formation 
of clear, intelligible, certain and unequivocal texts of 
legal regulations in a state governed by the rule of law – 
arrive at the conclusion that the text is in conflict with 
such principles. What is needed to solve such a puzzle 
(as it was expressed by the Austrian Constitutional 
Court in one of its findings )6 is diligence and patience. 
In the case of the Lisbon Treaty, however, there is 
a “mitigating circumstance.” The authors of this puzzle7 
were so nice that they at least provided us with clues at 
the end.8 Thanks to this and our knowledge of the previ-
ous numbering systems, we are able to find where the 
relevant provision is currently located, how it is identi-
fied and where it will be placed under the new num-
bering system. Any failure to do so will result in a con-
fusion of terms. What is also bizarre is that, owing to 
the special numbering system, the petitioner and the 
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Constitutional Court will have to agree which of the 
three versions to use in order to be able to understand 
each other at all.9 However, this is not the end: in addi-
tion, there are 13 protocols and 65 declarations of the 
contracting parties in which they assure each other that 
they are serious about the whole issue and that they do 
not have any other intentions. 
In the case of the EU, this is not just about the fre-
quency of words such “democracy,” “values,” etc., in 
the text of the Lisbon Treaty, but is also about the form 
by which this text makes such values accessible to EU 
citizens. What is even more significant, however, is the 
fact that the so-called “European constitutional agree-
ment” of 2004 (the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe), which had been turned down, is resubmit-
ted for adoption again, merely cleared of any indica-
tions of a future super-state.10 This is further evidence 
that the “D plan”, i.e., dialogue and democracy is not 
meant quite seriously in actual reality. But, the warning 
contained in the Maastricht judgment of the Federal 
Constitutional Court11 is still valid: this stated that de-
mocracy is not just a formal principle of accountability 
of decisions (“Zurechnungsprinzip”); by contrast, it 
should stem from the competition of social forces, inte-
rests, and ideas, making the decision-making process of 
bodies exercising their supreme power and the current 
political aims clearly visible and intelligible, and the 
fact that voters can communicate with such a power in 
their own mother tongues. 
2. Formulation of the Senate’s proposal 
However, the proposal by the Senate of the Parlia-
ment of the Czech Republic did not make the role of the 
Constitutional Court any easier. The extent of the mo-
tion was merely three pages,12 which mostly consisted 
not of statements or evidence supporting such state-
ments but questions and notes interrogation. Something 
like that has been unheard of in the previous experience 
of the Constitutional Court.13 The formulation of the 
statement of the ruling (i.e. the very proposal how the 
Court should decide)14 raises doubts – in light of the 
doctrine of the Constitutional Court on being bound by 
the formulation of the proposal of the statement – whe-
ther it satisfies at all the requirements of the provisions 
in Art. 71e para. 1 and 2 of the Act on the Constitu-
tional Court, specifying the requirements on proposal 
on statements of ruling in motions to be decided by the 
Constitutional Court. The Senate’s motion is evidently 
based on Art. 71a of the Act, which, however, merely 
describes the subject matter of the proceedings. In the 
form of a question rather than a statement of alleged 
unconstitutionality, the Senate merely demands that the 
Constitutional Court decides on the conformity of the 
Lisbon Treaty with the constitutional order, without 
unequivocally pointing out the direction in which a de-
cision should be made.15 The contrary formulation of 
the proposal of the statement of the ruling (i.e., the 
expression of conformity with the constitutional order) 
is hardly conceivable with respect to the purpose of the 
proceedings, i.e., to prevent the ratification of an uncon-
stitutional obligation.16 This kind of formulation is 
possible only in the statement of a Constitutional Court 
finding (the ratification of a treaty is not in conflict) in 
which the court expresses its disagreement that an 
international treaty is not in conformity with the consti-
tutional order. The Senate, however, included various – 
and quite diverse – versions of the statement in the 
proposal of its petition. There is no doubt about what 
a reporting judge would do after receiving a constitu-
tional complaint whose proposal of the statement of 
ruling would request that the Constitutional Court 
should decide, in the sense of Art. 87 para. 1 of the 
Constitution or Art. 82 para. 1 of the Act on the Consti-
tutional Court, about the conformity of an action of pu-
blic authority with the constitutionally guaranteed rights 
of the complainant.17 Either the complainant will have 
to cure defects of such proposal of the statement by the 
deadline designated by the reporting judge or the com-
plaint shall be rejected on procedural grounds. 
The actual petition gives the impression that the 
Senate does not consider the Constitutional Court as 
a court but as to be some kind of constitutional council 
– a sort of advisory body.18 Further evidence of the atti-
tude of politicians towards the Constitutional Court is 
provided by the statement by a member of the Govern-
ment on TV, demanding that the Constitutional Court 
“hurry up” so that the ratification process could be 
continued in September, as well as a statement by an-
other government official that the Constitutional Court 
“begged” the government for a position on the Lisbon 
Treaty. Let me just add that this matter does not con-
cern a direct politicisation of the Constitutional Court, 
as, for instance, in the case of its decision-making on 
public budget reforms. The incursion of the judiciary 
into the area of foreign policy is quite in place: this is 
also because of the nature of the EU and the obligations 
which arise for the Czech Republic on account of its 
membership in this (at least so far) supra-national or-
ganization.19 The reason why the title of the present 
article mentions the procedure of preventive review – as 
opposed to the petition for review of the accession 
treaty (Pl. ÚS 1/04) that had been denied entry into the 
“gates” of the Constitutional Court (being dismissed 
a limine fori, i.e., literally “from the court’s threshold”) 
– is that, if the Constitutional Court had adopted a stric-
ter attitude, the petition could already have been relega-
ted into the archives of the Court for reasons stated in 
the previous paragraph. However, it is questionable 
whether this might not give rise to suspicions that the 
Constitutional Court is playing its own game in the 
form of a delaying tactic, thereby lending support to 
opponents of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. On 
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the other hand, the objection might be raised that the 
Court’s decision may be on account of the fact that the 
petition is easier to process in comparison with the high 
level of debate on the Lisbon Treaty in the Senate. 
As a result, a whole range of procedural issues arise 
in this connection, even prior to the actual decision on 
the petition itself. These issues deserve to be addressed 
here, while it is necessary to point out certain new cir-
cumstances which – as is usual – are likely to surface 
during the practical realization of a legal rule. The po-
sitions expressed in the commentaries to the Act on the 
Constitutional Court20 are, understandably, still consid-
erations de interpretatione ferenda. The final word in 
the contested points will rest on the Constitutional 
Court, which has decided in this connection not to de-
cide any other issues in the plenary before issuing its 
decision on this matter. Yet, there is a whole range of 
issues that need to be pointed out. They include, above 
all, the issue of the extent of the review, its criteria, 
procedures for discussion, and the majority vote neces-
sary to adopt a decision. The actual matter of the peti-
tion is directly relevant, but the mere description of the 
individual issues would go beyond the scope of this 
article, regardless of the fact that certain issues, such as 
the assessment of a possible intervention into the sover-
eignty of a state, are basically insoluble with respect to 
the changes in the understanding of this concept since 
1576, when it was introduced in the theory of the state 
by J. Bodin.21 The same holds for trying to answer 
whether, in connection with the acquisition of legal 
subjectivity, the EU is not, after all, gradually becoming 
a state body which is prohibited from being delegated 
some powers on the basis of Article 10a of the Consti-
tution. 
3. The extent of the review – the entire 
Lisbon Treaty or selected provisions only? 
It appears from the Senate’s petition that the Con-
stitutional Court should adopt a position concerning the 
Lisbon Treaty as a whole, because it causes a conflict 
with the characterization of the Czech Republic as a su-
preme, unified, and democratic legal country, as well as 
a change in some of its essential elements defined in 
Article 9(2) of the Constitution.22 At the same time, the 
Senate’s petition raises several specific doubts about 
some provisions of the TEU and TFEU. According to 
the Senate: 
1) TFEU establishes a classification of powers that is 
more characteristic for division of jurisdiction in 
federal states, by introducing a category of powers 
exclusive to the Union, which includes entire 
comprehensive areas of legal regulation (Art. 2a 
par. 1 of the TFEU). In conjunction with those 
facts, in the sphere of shared competences (Art. 4 
of the TFEU) there is, from the point of view of 
Art. 10a of the Constitution, a transfer of compe-
tences to the Union in a scope that can not be fully 
determined in advance, 
2) the Art. 352 par. 1 of the TFEU, which is not limi-
ted to regulation of the internal market, and is thus 
a blanket norm that permits enacting measures 
beyond the scope of Union competences, i.e. 
beyond the scope of transferred powers under Art. 
10a of the Constitution, 
3) application of a general transitional clause (passe-
relle) for purposes of changing unanimous decision 
making to decision making by a qualified majority 
in a particular area or replacing a special legislative 
procedure by an ordinary legislative procedure 
under Art. 48 par. 7 of the TEU is a change of po-
wers under Art. 10a of the Constitution, without 
that change being accompanied by ratification of an 
international treaty or the active consent of Parlia-
ment. As regards Art. 83 par. 1 of the TFEU, there 
is no opportunity at all for Parliament to express 
lack of consent; thus, this can de facto render Art. 
15 par. 1 of the Constitution meaningless, 
4) international treaties negotiated and approved by 
a qualified majority in the Council (not unani-
mously) under Art. 216 of the TFEU would also be 
binding on member states that did not consent to 
them, even though the standard ratification process 
would not take place in these states, and, in the case 
of the Czech Republic, the opportunity for prelimi-
nary judicial review as to whether such treaties are 
consistent with the constitutional order would also 
disappear. Therefore, the Senate expressed doubts 
as to whether this process is compatible with Art. 
49 and Art. 63 par. 1 let. b) of the Constitution, and 
whether there is room to apply these treaties based 
on Art. 10 of the Constitution, 
5) the indirect reference to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU, together with the future accession 
of the EU to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (Art. 6 par. 1 and 2 of the TEU) can lead to 
lack of clarity about the status of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (the “CFREU”), and 
it is not clear whether this construction will streng-
then or, on the contrary, lower the standard of 
domestic protection of human rights enshrined in 
the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms (the “CFRF”), 
6) there is a question whether Art. 2 of the TEU is 
consistent with Art. 1 par. 1 and Art. 2 par. 1 of the 
Constitution (the principle of the sovereignty of the 
people), in view of the fact that it expands the 
values on which the Union is established, which 
could, through a mechanism of suspending mem-
bership rights, be used to create political pressure to 
change domestic legal orders concerning such fun-
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damental issues against the will of the sovereign, 
i.e. the people.23 
 
A double problem has, thus, been created for the 
Constitutional Court.24 If it assessed the constitutional-
ity of the entire treaty, it could constitute a barrier rei 
iudicatae for other potential petitioners. This is because 
Art. 71a of the Act on the Constitutional Court contains 
a construction under which the right to file a petition to 
the Constitutional Court arises gradually to the individ-
ual petitioners in relation to the actual stage of the pro-
cedure of giving the consent for ratification (Art. 
71a para. 1 of the Act on the Constitutional Court). It 
appears from previous judicial decisions that this is not 
possible. Examples may be given of decisions (so far 
only in the case of legal rules) where the Constitutional 
Court decided on an overall petition for the cancellation 
of an entire legal regulation in such a way that it gran-
ted the petition with respect to several provisions, not 
refusing but dismissing the remaining parts of the 
petition.25 In this way, the impression might be created 
of causing an obstacle rei iudicatae. However, the po-
sition by the Constitutional Court must respect the in-
terconnectedness between the statement and its reason-
ing (otherwise even a decision by the Constitutional 
Court might be void). In this case, however, such 
a problem should not arise because – with a view to the 
specificity of the statement concerning preventive re-
view under Art. 71e para. 1 and para. 2 of the Act on 
the Constitutional Court – the Constitutional Court 
should deal with insubstantial (and even more so with 
unsubstantiated) allegations in the reasoning of its 
finding, not in the statement. This should not prevent 
other potential petitioners from challenging some other 
provisions of the treaty or even (in my opinion) the 
same provisions but substantiated with some other, new 
arguments. The idea that the Constitutional Court will 
deal in detail with such an extensive and incomprehen-
sible text – once and for all, even without the petition 
for review meeting the requirements of Art. 34 of the 
Act on the Constitutional Court – is totally out of the 
question.26 This is not a parallel to the criminal notice 
(complaint) of suspected unconstitutionality; in addi-
tion, there is a whole range of other arguments against, 
mainly the actual raison-d’etre of preventive review.27 
The fact that other potential petitioners are ex lege par-
ties to the proceedings (except for the government and 
groups of MPs or Senators) does not deprive such 
petitioners of the possibility of filing an independent 
petition once it is their turn, under Art. 71 para. 1 of the 
Act on the Constitutional Court, within the process of 
expressing one’s approval.28 
4. What parts of the text of the Lisbon Treaty 
should the Constitutional Court review? 
There are EU-wide discussions on what is new in 
the Lisbon Treaty in comparison with the current state. 
The Constitutional Court is unlikely to be spared such 
considerations, although these will be engaged from 
a different standpoint. The preventive review of an 
international treaty should not be a pretext for a subse-
quent review of, e.g., the contents of the Accession 
Treaty of 2003. It will therefore have to be decided 
what the limits of the preventive review are (i.e., the 
new situation), separating out the previously agreed or 
formed legal situation (acqui communautaire), in which 
there would be, from the substantive standpoint, no 
preventive review. However, the Constitutional Court 
cannot be required to stake out those areas in EU 
primary law which – from the position of the Lisbon 
Treaty – already work, and separate them from new 
developments introduced under this treaty. This is 
a rather complex issue, and its critics are typically put 
down by being told that such specificities are not yet 
explicitly mentioned in the primary law but are 
contained in the judicial decisions of the European 
Court of Justice.29 Since even similar provisions may 
obtain quite different contents in new contexts, none of 
them may be ruled out from the review, save perhaps 
for derogatory and operative provisions. It generally 
holds that the challenged provisions are not subject to 
review.30 The Constitutional Court will not likewise 
assess those parts of the Lisbon Treaty (comprising also 
dozens of protocols and declarations of a general and 
special nature) which do not concern the Czech Repu-
blic. In this connection, the general principle needs to 
be stated that where a member state gives a free hand to 
the future European Court of Justice to modify or even 
create new law, then the question needs to be asked 
whether it makes sense to engage in an abstract dispute 
over something that will obtain its specific shape only 
in its judicial decisions on thousands of pages of com-
plicated texts of primary law. The current ECJ does not 
ask the question of whether the EU is a state; it behaves 
as if it were, although what is missing is the proverbial 
competence exclusivity (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) refer-
red to by Kelsen. 
Thus, the Constitutional Court finds itself for the 
first time in a situation quite different from reviewing 
the constitutionality of amendments of acts as a subse-
quent control of the constitutionality of legal regula-
tions. In that area, the court has established quite a con-
sistent doctrine according to which it reviews the con-
tent of the original text as modified by the amendment, 
which does not have an independent existence. In the 
case of amendments, the court assesses only the formal 
aspects, such as the observance of the procedure of its 
adoption and publication (cf. for instance, findings Nos. 
30/1998 Sb. and 476/2002 Sb.). The use of this doctri-
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ne, however, turns out to be entirely impractical with 
respect to preventive review, simply on account of the 
nature of the matter itself. 
The form of the Lisbon Treaty as the subject matter 
of review is related to the provision of Art. 71d para. 3 
of the Act on the Constitutional Court, under which the 
Constitutional Court is not limited to the assessment of 
the content of an international treaty with respect to the 
constitutional order. Here, unlike Art. 68 para. 1 of the 
Act on the Constitutional Court, no assessment is re-
quired about whether an international treaty has been 
concluded by a body which was authorised to do so and 
whether the process of its conclusion was in conformity 
with the national constitutional law. I have expressed 
my opinion on this matter several times, also by raising 
an objection to the possible conflict between Art. 71d 
para. 3 of the Act on the Constitutional Court and Art. 
87 para. 2 and Article 88 para. 1 of the Constitution.31 
In this connection, let me mention another aspect and 
formulate a conclusion in the form of a question. All 
proponents of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty 
claim that it does not contain any possibility of a trans-
fer of new competencies from the Czech Republic to 
the EU. The exclusion of the review of procedural is-
sues therefore hides another problem. In the event that 
both houses of the Parliament will approve the ratifica-
tion according to the procedure in Article 49 of the 
Constitution, i.e., under the conditions of Art. 39 para. 1 
and para. 2 of the Constitution (i.e., the majority of the 
members present) and the President of the Czech Re-
public subsequently proves to the Constitutional Court 
that such a transfer happens, would the Constitutional 
Court be able to state that it may not deal with the 
breach of the procedure specified in Article 10a para 2 
and Article 39 para. 4 of the Constitutional Court (the 
qualified majority)?32 In such a case, this will concern 
not only the self-limitation of the Constitutional Court, 
which should not review whether the transfer of com-
petencies is or is not in conformity with the interests of 
the Czech Republic (this is a typical problem in the 
sense of a “political question doctrine”) but also the 
problem of procedure which does not, in this case, en-
croach upon the area of international law. 
Another issue consists in deciding what benchmark 
should be used for assessing an authentic international 
treaty. This will be the first time that the Constitutional 
Court will apply the provisions on the reference crite-
rion for review, which are not formulated in a uniform 
manner. The prescribed criterion for the assessment of 
conformity is, under Art. 71a of the Act on the Consti-
tutional Court, a constitutional law, while Article 87 
para. 2 of the Constitution (to which Art. 71a para. 1 
refers) stipulates that this should be the constitutional 
order. The same notion (“the constiturional order”) is 
mentioned in Art. 71e of the Act on the Constitutional 
Court. This cannot be considered just as a technical 
mistake; it would be insignificant if the Constitutional 
Court was not striving to extend the interpretation of the 
notion of “constitutional order” (cf. the finding No. 
403/2002 Sb.).33 However, it is hardly conceivable that 
the criterion for the review of an international treaty by 
the Constitutional Court should consist in another 
international treaty, be it a treaty on human rights. Since 
the constitutional order is made up, according to Article 
112 para. 1 of the Constitution, of constitutional acts 
and the Charter, then this particular case will call for the 
assessment of conformity with a specific constitutional 
act and its provision, rather than the constitutional order 
as a whole – unless the Constitutional Court decides to 
reopen this issue once again. The constitutional order 
does not have any provisions, as a part of the imprecise 
formulation in Art. 71e para. 1 of the Act on the Consti-
tutional Court. Should a possible conflict be found, then 
it does not matter what constitutional provision it con-
flicts with.34 The review cannot be limited only to Arti-
cle 9 para. 2 of the Constitution (so-called “material 
core” of the Constitution) or Article 1 of the Charter, as 
it might be possible in the event of an already valid EC 
and EU law in the sense of the findings of the Consti-
tutional Court concerning constitutionality of the sugar 
quotas (No. 154/2006 Sb.) and the European arrest 
warrant (No. 434/2006 Sb.). 
5. The effect of the Irish referendum 
on the procedure of the Czech 
Constitutional Court 
Decision-making in the field of international politics 
necessarily leads to the necessity of reacting to other 
contracting parties, which is not customary in other 
areas of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. In 
this case, this concerns the issue of the Irish referen-
dum, which turned the Lisbon Treaty down. As a con-
sequence, the Constitutional Court might have found 
itself facing a new question, arising to it, just as in the 
case of some other constitutional courts in connection 
with the previous35 European constitutional treaty, 
which was turned down in referenda in France and the 
Netherlands. However, in this case, the situation is 
different,36 and the Constitutional Court did not have 
reason to discontinue or stop the proceedings because 
the contractual process still continues. Apart from that, 
discussions constantly tend to overlook the provision in 
Article 48 para. 5 of the new numbering of the EU trea-
ty, which anticipates such a situation.37 This provides 
that, if the Lisbon Treaty is ratified by four fifths of 
member states within two years after its conclusion, and 
if one or more member states meet obstacles while 
ratifying it, the issue will be dealt with by the European 
Council. It is, therefore, anticipated that, in order to 
assess the situation, the process will have to be con-
cluded in all of the 28 contracting parties of the ratifi-
cation process (the EU itself and its member states), 
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because without this, the European Council cannot look 
for possible solutions. 
6. What will the Constitutional Court decide 
and by what majority 
It is not quite clear from the prayer of the Senate’s 
petition what statement the Senate actually requests. 
This does not unequivocally arise even from the special 
provision in Art. 71e of the Act on the Constitutional 
Court. This proceeding is different from judicial review 
of legal regulations because it essentially concerns the 
pronouncement of an authoritative position on the con-
stitutionality of an international treaty. Its aim is to 
block the potential ratification (Art. 87 para. 2 of the 
Constitution), not the process of ratification. The ques-
tion the Constitutional Court is addressing in this case is 
not how many and which provisions, but whether the 
ratification is possible or not. This is one of the reasons 
why the second division (Art. 71a – 71e) does not con-
tain an explicit reference to the first division (Art. 64– 
71) of the special part of the Act on Constitutional 
Court (control of constitutionality and legality of en-
actments). Approval is given to an international treaty 
as a whole because it may be ratified only in its en-
tirety.38 Should even a single provision of this treaty be 
found unconstitutional, this will not change the result in 
any way. There is a parallel with the two houses of the 
Parliament: just as they can only approve or dismiss the 
ratification of a treaty (Art. 108 para. 6 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Chamber of Deputives and Art. 117b 
para. 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate), the 
Constitutional Court may only decide in its finding that 
an international treaty (i.e., not its individual provi-
sions) may not be ratified.39 
The issue is about the prevention of a possible un-
constitutional situation and not about repression, i.e., 
about the removal of an unconstitutional situation. 
A conflict with other law is not a problem with respect 
to the place of such treaties within the application 
hierarchy of Czech law (pursuant to Art. 10 of the Con-
stitution conventio derogat legi). The provision of Art. 
71e of the Act on the Constitutional Court does not 
require the Constitutional Court to state in its finding 
which provision(s) of an international treaty are consi-
dered to be in conflict with the constitutional order; it 
does, however, require the listing of the specific con-
stitutional provisions with which a conflict is found. In 
this way, the unconstitutional elements of an interna-
tional treaty will be indirectly identified (unless this 
occurs in the statement). It is not, however, impossible 
(the practice of delivering statements is still developing) 
that the general statement under Art. 71e(1) of the Act 
on the Constitutional Court will combine with an enu-
meration of the problematic provisions of a treaty or, by 
contrast, an enumeration of those provisions which are 
found to be constitutionally all right. 
It appears (so far only in the literature) that another 
contested issue is what majority is necessary to carry 
the decision of the Constitutional Court in this matter. 
According to one of the opinions,40 the principle in 
favorem conventionis should be applied,41 similarly to 
judicial review of laws. This is based on the prerequi-
site that the President and the government will be sign-
ing treaties that conform to the Constitution and that the 
contrary needs to be proved. This is based, under Art. 
13 of the Act on the Constitutional Court, on the quali-
fied majority (i.e., nine votes). An interesting position is 
taken by another commentary,42 which probably fa-
vours the standpoint that the qualified majority must be 
reached in order to express the conformity (or – better – 
the incontestability) of an international treaty with the 
constitutional order.43 In theory, the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty could be blocked by two votes if the 
quorum is 10 judges or by 7 votes if the quorum is 15 
judges. The decision would, thus, be made by the noto-
rious and egregious “relevant minority.”44 It will, there-
fore, also be important how this issue is clarified. 
7. Addendum 
During the author’s proof of this study the Constitu-
tional Court delivered its judgment. Hitherto it is not at 
the disposal its full wording.45 On the basis of the an-
nounced parts of the ruling46 we can state that the most 
of the procedural questions treated in this study were 
answered in the first part of the ruling.47 In this respect, 
the Court especially pointed out, that it concentrates its 
review only on those provisions of the international 
treaty whose accordance with the constitutional order 
the petitioner expressly contested, and where, in an 
effort to meet the burden of allegation, it supported its 
claims with constitutional law arguments. The Consti-
tutional Court also stated more precisely that in this 
review it did not intend, for a number of reasons, to 
distinguish between the provisions of the Treaty of 
Lisbon described as “normatively” old or new, i.e. it 
reviewed all those provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon 
that the petitioner properly contested. Important is an 
additional statement of the Constitutional Court, that it 
can review whether an act by bodies of the Union ex-
ceed the powers that the Czech Republic transferred to 
the European Union under Art. 10a of the Constitution, 
however only in utterly exceptional cases. 
Thus, the findings (in a narrow sense) sounds as 
follows: The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community in Art. 2 par. 1 (originally Art. 2a par. 
1), Art. 4 par. 2 (originally Art. 2c), Art. 352 par. 1 
(originally Art. 308 par. 1), Art. 83 (originally Art. 69b 
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par. 1) and Art. 216 (originally Art. 188l) of the TFEU, 
as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, in Art. 2 (origi-
nally Art. 1a), Art. 7 and Art. 48 par. 6 and 7 of the 
TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
is not in conflict with the constitutional order. 
Thus, the story of the Lisbon Treaty will continue. If 
the process of approval of the ratification was success-
ful in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, 
there will be waiting President Václav Klaus at the 
end.48 According to him, any discussion on when the 
Lisbon Treaty will be passed or rejected by the Czech 
Republic is pointless now because of the Irish referen-
dum.49 
 
_____________________________ 
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 The following abbreviations in this study will be used: 
„Sb.“ as Collection of Laws, the Czech official journal for 
promulgation of legal enactments, “TEU” as “the Treaty on 
European Union”, “TFEU” as the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, “the Constitution of the Czech Re-
public” as “the Constitution”. 
2
 The legal system of the Czech Republic does not allow for 
a subsequent constitutional review of international treaties. 
However, the decisions of the Constitutional Court have 
already shown that this should not obstruct the protection of 
fundamental rights of individuals by means of constitutional 
complaints. Cf. the finding II. ÚS 405/02 of 2003 (available at 
nalus.usoud.cz in Czech or at www.usoud.cz in English) on 
the issue of Slovak pensions paid to Czech citizens.  
3
 The English versions of the Constitution of the Czech Re-
public, the Act on the Constitutional Court and other regula-
tions are available online at: http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/ 
sqw/hp.sqw?k=31. 
4
 In actual practice, there has only been one petition filed for 
reviewing the conformity of the international treaty on the 
accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. This, however, 
could not be heard (Pl. ÚS 1/04, cf. nalus.usoud.cz) because it 
was filed after the deadline for its submission. In the case of 
the “European constitution,” the expected proposal could not 
even be filed because of the failure of the proposal in the 
national referenda in France and the Netherlands. The attempt 
of the President to start proceedings on the “European con-
stitution” was dealt with by the Constitutional Court “in front 
of the gates”: informally, in the form of a letter, which is 
a suitable manner of responding to a letter.  
5
 It seems as if this unintelligible form was meant to cover up 
the fact that the Lisbon Treaty takes over a significant part of 
the “European constitution” and should simultaneously serve 
as a prevention against holding referenda on a text which 
cannot be grasped without the consolidated texts of both 
treaties.  
6
 This is the so-called Denksporterkenntniss from 1994 (G 
135/93 VfGH), which concluded that a legal regulation is in 
conflict with the principle of the legal state if “In order to find 
out its sense, extensive knowledge of constitutional law, qua-
lified legal expertise and experience, as well as archivists’ 
diligence are needed” or where the understanding depends on 
“exceptional methodological abilities and a certain pleasure of 
solving puzzles.”  
7
 T. Oppermann: Die Europäische Union von Lissabon. 
DVBl., 2008, vol. 8, p. 476 uses the fitting description as “an 
unreadable monster” (ein unlesbares Monstrum). 
8
 However, if common people read Article 5 of the Treaty, 
which explains the secrets of the numbering system, the 
changes in referencing, etc., they will not be really encour-
aged to read on, especially if they encounter the “horizontal 
changes” specified in Article 2 which further obfuscate the 
text.  
9
 Otherwise it might review the constitutionality of provi-
sions identified differently from the petitioner. It will be only 
the official, i.e., the “consolidated,” text of both new treaties 
that will make the primary EU law again user-friendly for EU 
citizens. This version, however, was published in the Official 
Journal of EU only on 9 May 2008 (208/C 115/01), i.e., at 
a time when the Senate’s petition had already been submitted 
to the Constitutional Court.  
10
 For a detailed analysis, see: House of Lords. European 
Union Committee. The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assess-
ment. HL Paper 62-I (The Report) a 62-II (Evidence). The 
literature states that 95 to 99 per cent of the content of the 
European constitutional treaty has been taken over (“saved”). 
For more details, see e.g., Terhechte, J. Ph.: Der Vertrag von 
Lissabon: Grundlegende Verfassungsurkunde der europäi-
schen Rechtsgemeinschaft oder technischer Änderungsver-
trag? EuR, 2008, No. 2, p. 189, which gives the figure as 95 
per cent. J. P. Bonde, in the electronic version of his 
study, New name – Same content. The Lisbon Treaty – is it 
also an EU Constitution? 2nd ed. 2007, p. 8 (http://www.j.dk/ 
exp/images/bondes/BOOK_New_name_-
same_content_EN.pdf), offers the opinion of A. Stubb, 
a Finnish representative at inter-governmental conferences for 
the preparation of the treaty, that the commonality of both 
texts is 99 per cent. Cf. also Bergmann, J.: Bericht aus Eu-
ropa: Vertrag von Lisabon und aktuelle Rechtsprechung. 
DÖV, 2008, No. 8, p. 305-309. It may basically be said that 
analyses agree in numbers. What they differ in is just the 
conclusion whether this constitutes a success (the saving of 
the European constitutional treaty) or a failure to respect the 
opinions of EU citizens. 
11
 Detailed description and documentation is provided in 
Winkelmann, I.: Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts vom 12. Oktober 1993. Berlin 1994. 
12
 Its text was included in the annex to the decision No. 257 
from the 33rd meeting of the Senate’s Committee for EU 
affairs. The senate approved this proposal during its meeting 
on 24 April 2008, with the majority of 48 votes, with 4 votes 
against (out of 70 senators present). 
13
 An example of how thorough a proposal in such a serious 
matter may be can be provided by the situation in Germany: 
the motion by MP P. Gauweiler (this includes other issues in 
addition to the constitutional complaint) has over 300 pages; 
S. Hassel-Reusing’s constitutional complaint has 114 pages; 
D. Dehma’s complaint has 63 pages; the motion by Die Linke 
has 61 pages. Not intending to criticize that honorable institu-
tion, the extent of the proposal of the Senate is surprising, 
especially with a view to what excellent experts the Senate 
has, what attention was paid to this Treaty in its bodies, and 
what the level of the plenary debate was.  
14
 The formulation of the statement of the ruling (terms of the 
judgement) is called „petit“ in Czech. The Czech theory of 
procedural law traditionally distinguishes between such  
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a „petit“ and the giving reasons for it. The Senate requests in 
its proposal of the statement of the ruling (petit) that the 
Constitutional Court should decide “in the sense of Art. 87 
para. 2 of the Constitution, as amended by the constitutional 
acts No. 395/2001 Sb., and Art. 71e of the Act No. 182/1993 
Sb., on the Constitutional Court, as amended by the Act 
No. 48/2002 Sb., on the conformity of the Treaty with the 
constitutional order.”  
15
 The Constitutional Court is not the state’s notary; therefore, 
any proposal may only request the court to declare non-corre-
spondence. In the opposite case, the Constitutional Court will 
not turn down anything (just as it will not cancel anything in 
the event of granting the motion), it will simply – with a view 
to the nature of the preventive nature of the review – declare 
correspondence, thereby dismissing the motion. For more 
details, see Filip-Holländer-Šimíček: Zákon o ústavním sou-
du. Komentář [Commentary to the Act on Constitutional 
Court]. 2nd ed. C. H. Beck, Praha 2007, pp. 485-487. It will 
therefore be interesting to observe how the Constitutional 
Court will deal with this formulation.  
16
 Of course, one may come across this in the practice of 
constitutional courts, e.g., where someone wants to convince 
someone else about the constitutionality of, for instance, 
a law. However, a constitutional court will be requested to 
cancel such a law as unconstitutional, although it will be 
expected that such a petition will be turned down, thereby 
confirming the constitutionality of such an act. 
17
 I.e., being asked to choose himself whether to agree with 
the petition in full or in part, or whether to dismiss it in full or 
in part. By all means, the proposal of the statement shall be 
definite and unequivocal. Its formulation in such a form is the 
most important task of the petitioner.  
18
 In the case of treaties, the government may, in pursuance to 
Article 24 of the EU Treaty and Article 300 of the EC Treaty, 
ask for an opinion from the European Court of Justice. 
19
 On the other hand, one cannot fail to see the application of 
the possibility to defer the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by 
means of a petition to the Constitutional Court. Unlike the so-
called concordat with the Vatican, which was “removed” by 
a decision of the Chamber of the Representatives, the majority 
of Senators did not refuse to give their approval but referred 
the matter to the Constitutional Court.  
20
 Cf. Filip/Holländer/Šimíček: Zákon o Ústavním soudu. 
Komentář [Commentary to the Act on Constitutional Court]. 
2nd ed. C.H.Beck, Praha 2007, pp. 457-489 and Wagnerová, 
E. a kol.: Zákon o Ústavním soudu s komentářem [The Act on 
Constitutional Court with a Commentary] ASPI, Praha 2007, 
pp. 3298-315. 
21
 Bodin, J.: Six Books of the Commonwealth. Oxford 1955. 
Cf. mainly chapter 10 of the first book on the properties of 
sovereignty (p. 40n).  
22
 To be correct, the Senate does not claim this (see above); it 
actually just asks the question whether this is not the case, 
although the relevant section of the petition does not finish 
with a question mark. The possible ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty is challenged but not explicitly.  
23
 President Václav Klaus, as a party to the proceeding 
according to art. 71c of the Constitutional Court Act sup-
ported the Senate’s arguments. According to his opinion, the 
Lisbon Treaty is at variance with the spirit of the Constitution 
and its "material core" and will push the EU closer to a fed-
erative state. The remaining party to the proceedings, i.e. the 
Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament represented by its 
Chairman Miloslav Vlček took rather neutral position. In 
contrast to the President’s argumentation, the Government 
rejected the Senate’s objections and tried to give reasons for 
conformity of the Lisbon Treaty with the constitutional order. 
24
 Regardless of the fact that the entire petition would have to 
be divided among several reporting judges, just as in the case 
of judicial review of the constitutionality of the Act 
No. 261/2007 Sb. on Reform of Public Budgets. 
25
 This was the case in a few findings as e.g., the finding 
No. 131/1994 Sb. (concerning the Act No. 229/1991 Sb., on 
Land, as subsequently amended), the finding No. 410/2001 
Sb. (concerning the sugar quotas) as well as the finding 
No. 2/2008 Sb. (concerning the Act No. 261/2007 Sb., on 
Reform of Public Budgets). 
26
 The Constitutional Court uses the following formulation: 
“Where the petitioner in the proceedings on the review of 
norms cannot bear the burden of alleged unconstitutionality, 
such a petition must be considered as in conflict with Art. 
34(1) of the Act No. 182/1993 Sb., and thus as incapable of 
being discussed with respect to the issue in the matter” (find-
ing No. 512/2004 Sb.). One can object to the transfer of terms 
from civil proceedings (i.e., “contested” and “uncontested” 
proceedings) into the abstract review of an international treaty 
which has not yet been ratified.” 
27
 Cf. Filip/Holländer/Šimíček: op. cit. p. 483. Wagnerová, E. 
a kol.: op. cit., p. 312, tentatively admits that the Constitutio-
nal Court could carry out a “remaining” review with the result 
of creating the situation rei iudicatae. 
28
 In this case, this concerns mainly the President of the Czech 
Republic, whose position on the Senate’s petition (available 
online at www.hrad.cz) specifies the significant problems of 
the subject matter of the proceedings. This would be possible 
if the Constitutional Court decided that the Lisbon Treaty is in 
conformity with the constitutional order and if the process of 
approval of the ratification was successful in both the Senate 
and the Chamber of Deputies. 
29
 A suitable example consists of the development of judicial 
decisions of the US Supreme Court and its doctrines of resid-
ual powers of states and, above all, implied powers of the 
federation. The latter provided inspiration for the European 
Court of Justice as early as 1956 (cf. the decision in Fédéra-
tion Charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community. – Case 8-55 – derivation of 
the competence to conclude international treaties from the 
competence to regulate a certain issue within the EC).  
30
 Unlike Poland and Great Britain, the Czech Republic did 
not negotiate any exceptions. Its declarations concerning the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU are merely parts of 
the textual organization of the Lisbon Treaty, with individual 
states confirming that they have understood the text properly. 
31
 Cf. Filip/Holländer/Šimíček: op. cit. p. 481n. 
32
 In this connection, I emphasize the procedural aspect rather 
than the content. One cannot, however, fail to consider the 
Protocol on the application of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU in Poland and Great Britain, the role of the 
future Court of Justice of the EU as an engine for integration, 
and the well-known doctrine of the Czech Constitutional 
Court, which deals not with individual issues but with every-
thing “in aggregate” (cf. the finding No. 64/2001 Sb. on the 
election reform). This (i.e., the rule of “what is too numerous 
becomes excessive”) is what the extensive argumentation of 
MP Gauweiler is clearly based on (cf. his petition to the Ger-
man Constitutional Court). 
33
 Cf. Filip, J.: Nález č. 403/2002 Sb. jako rukavice hozená 
ústavodárci Ústavním soudem. Právní zpravodaj, roč. 2002, 
No. 11. 

